×
Register an Account
Forgot Login?
BPFA RESPONSE

THE BPFA RESPONSE TO NYU BLIZZARD STUDY

The Buffalo Blizzard caused a tragic loss of life. To the families and friends who lost loved ones, Local 282 is very sorry for your loss during the Christmas Holiday.  Local 282 is doing what we can to ensure that this never happens again.  That our members never have to endure the physical and emotional trauma of responding ill prepared or not being able to respond at all. 

The "Lessons Learned from the Buffalo Blizzard" report is nothing more than a fluff piece put together in an effort to slowly cover up the glaring failures of people in leadership roles within the City of Buffalo, up to, during and after the Blizzard.  Specifically, I would like to discuss Fire Commissioner William Renaldo and the Buffalo Fire Department's preparation and response. 

I'd like to start with the fact that my name is in the report. I did communicate with Sarah Kaufman from NYU. I reached out to Ms. Kaufman to ensure that she spoke to the correct individuals within the BFD. Ms. Kaufman was given over a dozen names of ranking members within the BFD that were WORKING during the storm. These members would have provided her with good information on our preparedness and response because they were PRESENT from the beginning to the end of the storm. I, on the other hand, had no information of substance to give because I wasn't THERE. 

Then, a month before the report was issued, I followed up with Ms. Kaufman and inquired as to when the report would be released. I was informed that it was in the editing phase and it would be released in 2-4 weeks. I followed up with the members that I recommended Ms. Kaufman to speak with. Ms. Kaufman hadn't spoken to any of them. I reached out to Ms. Kaufman and asked her why she hadn't done so? I let her know that Local 282 felt that not speaking with any of them made her report moot before it was even written. 

After hearing this, she agreed to contact three of the suggested members. Those members were willing to speak to her. However, Commissioner Renaldo would only allow two of them to speak to her and specifically denied permission to one of them. The member that wasn't allowed to speak with Ms. Kaufman was the Division Chief in charge of the Department during the storm. Common sense dictates that his insight would be invaluable, yet the Commissioner denied him permission to speak with Ms. Kaufman. 

To be clear, in the editing phase of this report, it was the only time when our members were even considered or contacted. Ms. Kaufman did speak to Commissioner Renaldo in order to gain his command perspective. However, how can he speak to storm response when he was in Florida and his deputies were at home. This report was given to the City in draft form weeks before its official release in an obvious effort to edit the material and soften the blow. This report is akin to Governor Hochul coming to Buffalo soon after the storm to give accolades and awards. This Union recognizes this for what it was. A ceremony meant to divert our attention away from the epic failure to prepare for, and respond to a snowstorm in WNY. 

Quoting the report. The research team was asked to review the response to an unprecedented storm that occurred over a holiday. As such, the report should not be read as a suggestion of negligent conduct by any of the respondents or government officials, many of whom were heroic in a time of crisis. To the extent that words such as "inadequate” or “insufficient" appear in the report, the intent is the literal meaning; in other words, a given action or resource was not able to counter a particular circumstance. 

That statement is a perfect summary of the entire report. It relieves the people at the highest levels from any responsibility whatsoever. The actions of many of the respondents were heroic. However, we don't consider this level of loss of life anything but tragic. The report repeatedly states that this was a "generational storm".  It may have been a bad storm, but as the report also stated, the City of Buffalo is no stranger to snow storms. So, why aren't we prepared for them? 

The report talked about how the City is taking a proactive approach and sought expertise on how to better prepare for future blizzards of this magnitude. However the common definition of proactive is creating or controlling a situation by causing something to happen rather than responding to it after it has happened. I believe they meant to use the term reactive, acting in response to a situation rather than creating or controlling it. 

The report stated that despite these significant challenges, aspects of Buffalo's response were highly successful and demonstrated resourcefulness and bravery under immense pressure. Which ones? What aspect of the response was highly successful? That wasn't our members' experience. 

During the course of this study, the research team interviewed more than 30 stakeholders representing city and state government, community organizations, emergency responders, utility providers, and business owners. They didn't speak with the suggested members in the BFD until compelled to do so, were in the editing phase, and were blocked from speaking with one. 

In addition, representatives of the Police and Fire departments reported housing stranded residents in Buffalo's police stations and fire houses. However, many were not equipped with cots or meals to provide for these residents. Yes. The firehouses, which are in deplorable condition, are not equipped or prepared to house stranded citizens or feed them. That would take coordination and preplanning. They housed numerous stranded pedestrians and motorists, and remained at their police stations and fire houses well beyond their assigned shifts. 

Yes, our members were stranded at their firehouses for over 96 hours in some cases because there was no plan in place to relieve them. The Buffalo Fire Department (BFD) orchestrated fire response operations despite most of their vehicles becoming stuck in ice and snow at some point during the blizzard. They were able to maintain full staffing at the firehouses due to a well-developed reserve plan, and to transport residents to essential medical services, like dialysis appointments. 

A well developed reserve plan? They maintained full staffing because we were fully staffed at 0800 on Friday morning, period. There was no plan. 

Finally, all departments transitioned with ease to virtual coordination, greatly benefiting response and rescue operations. Having moved to Microsoft Teams and similar video conferencing tools when the COVID-19 pandemic hit in 2020 allowed for a simplified transition to online coordination. Had this storm occurred in 2019, coordination could have been far more difficult. 

What? We use carbon paper. Our payroll is on paper and transported by pony express. 

The emphasis on this point can only be meant to blunt the criticism that the Commissioner was on a vacation in Florida during the storm. Virtual communication is no replacement for leadership on the ground and this point is a weak attempt to justify the Commissioner's absence. 

The Reports recommendations: The report talked about Prevention: Steps taken well before the storm season and stated we are here. No, we were here in July of 2018 when the new Commissioner took over and did absolutely nothing to prepare the fire department for winter weather. The report talked about Protection: Specific planning in the days leading up to an expected storm. The commissioner preplanned in this case. He ensured that his family vacation was approved and left Buffalo on Tuesday Dec 20th in order to arrive safely in Florida prior to the storm's arrival. 

The report mentions preparedness in advance of a major hazard is a key component of emergency management plans. YES! This was a snow storm. Buffalo gets snow storms. No pre-planning was done. 

The report states, Develop an Emergency Operations Center within the City of Buffalo, helmed by the new Emergency Manager, to coordinate inter-departmental efforts, situational awareness, and physical assets. Continuous training of staff for emergency management preparedness, especially through inter-governmental tabletop exercises, is key. 

- The BFD has established and utilized an EOC as well as all the other aspects of this paragraph within the City under previous Commissioners at Fire HQ. 

- The Current Commissioner did not establish or utilize an EOC for either storm that occurred in the winter of 2022. 

Prior to and after the November storm, Local 282 brought concerns to the Commissioner about this and we were ignored. The Commissioner is the Emergency Management Coordinator. He has never pre-planned or coordinated a storm response in any way. He did no inter-departmental coordination. He did no tabletop exercises.He did no training in this area. 

This report recommends that the City hire an EMC They did, in 2018, and he didn't fulfill his duties. It recommends that the City establish an EOC for these events. 

-It does have an EOC. It just wasn't utilized. 

It recommends the City hire a fleet manager 

- In the BFD we have 3! 

They are not fulfilling their duties.  It recommends preplanning. Yes, which makes it obvious that no pre-planning was executed. 

Ask yourself, is no one responsible for what occurred during the Buffalo Blizzard? 

This storm took a tremendous toll on the WNY community. There was a tragic loss of life. It showed that the Fire Department was NOT prepared for a snow storm. This is Buffalo, NY. 

IT SHOULD BE





Page Last Updated: Jul 08, 2023 (07:45:25)
-
Buffalo Professional Firefighters Assoc.
500 Southside Pkwy
Buffalo, NY 14210
  716-856-4130

Top of Page image
Powered By UnionActive - Copyright © 2024. All Rights Reserved.